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Abstract 
The  Electronic  Product  Code  standard  for  RFID  systems  plays  a  significant  role  in  worldwide  RFID  
implementations.  A feature of the RFID standards has been the RFID Kill command which allows for the 
„permanent‟ destruction of an RFID tag through the issuing of a simple command. Whilst the inclusion of this 
command may be vital for user privacy it also opens up significant avenues for attack.  Whilst such attacks may 
be  well  documented  there  has  been  little  to  no  discussion  of  the  efficacy  of  the  differing  mitigation  
approaches  taken.  A  simple  formula  to   calculate  the  full timing  of  such  an  attack  on  differing  RFID  
setups  is  presented.  The  formula  allows  for  users  to  model  the  effect  that  altering  such  aspects  as  
timeout or  transmission  response  time  will  have  on  RFID  security.     
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) technology stems back to Faraday‘s discovery that light and radio waves 
were both forms of electromagnetic energy. The first concrete step towards the modern conception of RFIDs was 
made in 1948, although it was not until 1973 the first direct patent on passive RFID tags was lodged (Stockman, 
1948; Cardullo, 2005). RFID tags now come in various shapes and sizes including stick on labels, tie-on tags, 
3mm pellets, and button disks although internally, they consist of a microcontroller and an attached antenna 
embedded in a protective material.  
 
Every RFID system consists of three major components (Sarma et al., 2002, p.3): 
 “the RFID tag, or transponder, which is located on the object to be identified and is the data carrier in 
the RFID system,” 
 “the RFID reader, or transceiver, which may be able to both read data from and write data to a 
transponder,” and 
 “the data processing subsystem which utilizes the data obtained from the transceiver in some useful 
manner”. 
 
In a typical RFID system using passive tags, an interrogator (RFID Reader) receives data from an RFID Tag by 
first broadcasting a continuous-wave RF signal to the Tag (EPC Global, 2005a). Passive tags then use this signal 
to respond by modulating the reflection coefficient of its antenna, thereby backscattering an information signal to 
the reader. 
 
Of the numerable RFID standards, arguably one of the more significant in terms of applications is the Electronic 
Product Code (EPC) standard. The EPC standards were created by EPC global as an open, community based 
approach to promote the use of RFID technology in supply chain management (EPC Global, 2012). Since EPCs 
inception, the standards have been used in RFID systems worldwide and are significant in terms of the global 
RFID market (ibid). 
PASSWORDS IN RFID SYSTEMS 
 
An important factor in determining how resilient a system is to attack is to have a reasonable knowledge of how 
vulnerable a password based feature is to an attack.  Numerous works (Cross, 2008; Bonneau, 2012) have 
detailed the primary methods of password cracking: 
 
 Brute Force – Directly trying a sequence of passwords 
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 Dictionary – Applying a set of predetermined values against a password 
 Pre-Computed Hash – Subverting a system by attacking the password hash 
 Syllable – A combination of brute force and dictionary approach 
 Rule Based – Used where passwords fit a common form 
 
Before a method for determining vulnerability to such attacks could be created, an understanding of the length, 
composition and usage of passwords is required. EPC Gen 2 systems use two types of passwords or codes that 
are stored on the RFID tag namely the Kill and Access passwords (EPC Global, 2010). As this research is 
focused on quantifying the vulnerability of RFID systems to KILL Attacks only the Kill code will be discussed. 
The EPC Tag Data Standard (EPC Global, 2008, p.56) defines the Kill password as ―A 32-bit password that 
must be presented to the tag in order to complete the Gen 2 “kill” command‖. This statement clearly shows a 
physical limitation to the key space of 32bits or put another way one of 4,294,967,290 possible values. This is a 
considerable improvement of the 16bit size restriction of the generation one EPC standard (EPC Global, 2005b). 
Given the straightforward nature of this password the only applicable form of attack is brute force.  
THE KILL COMMAND 
 
The Kill command was incorporated into the standards as both a privacy and security measure. It was envisaged 
that the vendor would be able to kill a tag upon a successful sale and thus prevent further user tracking. This 
technique would also limit the chance that a used tag could give away potential compromising information about 
the vendor or their setup. 
As detailed by the EPC Class One Generation Two Protocol for Communication (EPC Global, 2008, p.67) all 
tags and interrogators adopting the EPC standards shall implement the Kill command in a set fashion. The 
procedure for this is detailed in figure 1. In brief, the interrogator (or reader) after establishing communication 
with a tag then issues a kill requests containing half the Kill password waiting for the tag to respond with its 
handle then send a second Kill request containing the rest of the password (EPC Global, 2008, p.67).  
As depicted in the figure below, depending on the outcome the tag will stay silent in the event of an invalid 
attempt, send an error code in the case of insufficient power or send confirmation of a valid kill. It is worth 
noting that if the password is set to a value of 00h the Kill operation is not allowable and the tag will respond 
with an error code.  
 
The standard is notable for not specifying a timeout between attempts at kill operations. However, as noted in 
Bolan (2007) some manufacturers have added these features in their tags and the inclusion of this feature does 
not violate the standard nor seem to preclude the granting of EPC compliance. Using this command an attacker 
might use a brute force approach and thus try every available password until a successful kill was achieved. In 
the case of a common password this attack could then kill every tag within range. 
 
To understand the effect of this attack let us consider the effect of a brute force Kill attack against an RFID 
enabled supermarket. The impact would be nothing short of devastating. An attacker could deploy a device that 
would render all tags within the store unusable.   
  
Unlike a denial of service or jamming attack this method would continue to be in effect even after the attacking 
device had ceased operation. Put in context, every item in the store would be invisible to any RFID based 
security feature, inventory system or point of sale scanners. Whilst it would be possible to recover from such an 
attack the logistics and cost of doing so would be significant with every tag requiring individual reactivation a 
task that could take up to a minute an item.  Assuming a typical supermarket has one million items and thirty 
staff were working consistently on reactivating items after a KILL attack has occurred, it would take 23 days to 
completely restore the supermarket to operation. 
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Figure 1 – The EPC Kill Procedure (EPC Global, 2008, p. 69). 
FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE PROCESS 
In providing a method to determine the relative duration of a successful attempt to brute force a Kill password 
required the consideration of all factors within the Kill procedure. These were determined to be: 
 
1. Duration of an unsuccessful Kill attempt 
 
One of the most important aspects when determining the duration required for a successful attack is the 
duration for a single attempt. In EPC RFID systems the speed of a communication round is determined 
by factors including the closeness of the tag and the interrogator, the speed of the reader and complaint 
tags as well as the environment.  
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2. Duration of a timeout between Kill attempts 
 
As noted in the previous section there is no set requirement within the standard for this feature. 
However, despite the lack of mandatory timeouts, many tags have incorporated this feature and the 
actual implementations vary between manufacturers.  
 
3. Number of tags that may be in range 
 
As with the variations in speed the range of RFID equipment is dependent on numerous factors. Whilst 
the power and frequency of EPC compliant equipment is specified within the standards there has been 
evidence of variations between manufacturers. Beyond these variations the physical location of an 
interrogator and tags will be significant in determining attack effectiveness. 
 
4. Key Space – Gen 1 Vs Gen 2 
 
Key space is critical in any consideration of cryptography. With EPC complaint RFID systems this key 
space is limited to either 16 bits for generation one equipment and 32 bits for generation two. However, 
it is conceivable that future generations will increase the key space so any formula for exploring the 
effectiveness of brute force Kill attacks should allow for this variable. 
 
5. Single or Multiple Password Setup 
 
The final factor for consideration is whether an EPC compliant implementation uses the same Kill 
password for each tag or varies the password from tag to tag. Logistically setting individual passwords 
on each tag may prove a challenge and manufacturers have typically supplied tags with either a 
standard default value. Given the variability of the setups and the restrictions on this paper the 
discussion is limited to single password setups. 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORMULA 
 
With these factors defined let us consider the case of a basic Kill Attack whereby a interrogator attempting to 
brute force in sequence starting from 01h attacks a single tag and assume no timeout enforced between attempts 
and Generation One tags. In this scenario we may define the values as detailed in table 1. It should be noted that 
the key space is lessened due to the 16bit size limitation of generation one tags. 
 
Table 1 – Variables in Scenario One 
Variable  Value 
Duration of an unsuccessful Kill Command 0.1 seconds 
Timeout between Kill Commands 0 seconds 
Number of Tags in Range 1 
Single or Multiple Passwords Single 
Key Space 16 bits = 32768 
 
In this straightforward scenario it is clear that each attempt will take  0.1 seconds and therefore to cover the 
entire key may be determined using the formula: 
 
 
 
Full Attack = (Attack Duration + Timeout) * Key Space 
 
= (0.1 + 0) * 32768 
 
=3276.8 seconds 
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or approximately 55 minutes (rounded up) 
 
 
 
However as noted previously a time out is often implemented in tags and if we now consider a timeout of ten 
seconds as found in numerous EPC tags we would therefore see: 
 
Full Attack = (Attack Duration + Timeout) * Key Space 
 
= (0.1 + 10) * 32768 
 
= 330956.8 seconds 
 
or approximately 92 hours (rounded up) 
 
Whilst this formula suffices for a brute force attack against a single tag, the next consideration was to include the 
number of tags in range where the Kill password was set to the same value on all tags. For this example the 
variables are shown in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 – Variables in Scenario Two 
Variable  Value 
Duration of an unsuccessful Kill Command 0.1 seconds 
Timeout between Kill Commands 10 seconds 
Number of Tags in Range 10 
Single or Multiple Passwords Individual 
Key Space 16 bits = 32768 
 
The above formula would not suffice as the in this scenario the reader would be able to continue to interrogate 
other tags within range whilst awaiting the timeout for the original attempt. From the above it may be seen that 
the interrogator would be able to perform attempts against ten values in a single second and then have to wait 9.1 
seconds before the next round of attacks. When considering this we have the following: 
 
Full Attack = Number of Iterations * Effective Timeout 
 
Number of Iterations = Key Space / Tags in Range 
 
Effective Timeout =  Timeout – ((Tags in Range – 1) * Attack Duration) 
 
Therefore: 
 
Full Attack = (Keyspace / Tags in Range) * (Timeout – ((Tags in Range – 1) * Attack Duration)) 
 
=  (32768 / 10) * (10 – ((10 – 1) * 0.1) 
 
= 3276.8 * 9.1 
 
=29818.88 seconds 
 
or approximately 8 hours and 17 minutes  
 
This approach had a limitation whereby the formula would not allow for negative timeout. That is if the number 
of tags within range is a value such that the effective timeout is less than zero the formula return an invalid value 
(i.e. a negative). This scenario is illustrated using the values in the table below whereby the number of tags in 
range is set at 150 (more than required to negate the timeout). 
 
Table 3 – Variables in Scenario Three 
Variable  Value 
Duration of an unsuccessful Kill Command 0.1 seconds 
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Timeout between Kill Commands 10 seconds 
Number of Tags in Range 150 
Single or Multiple Passwords Individual 
Key Space 16 bits = 32768 
 
Full Attack = (Keyspace / Tags in Range) * (Timeout – ((Tags in Range – 1) * Attack Duration)) 
 
=  (32768 / 150) * (10 – ((150 – 1) * 0.1) 
 
=-1070.4213 seconds 
 
 
Thus in the case of the timeout value being negated the formula would in essence become: 
 
Full Attack = Key Space / (Number of Attacks a second)  
 
Where  
 
Number of Attacks per Second = 1 / Time of Attack 
 
When considered against the previous formula we now see a more complex condition as shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Algorithm to determine Brute Force time for RFID Kill Attack 
UTILISING THE ALGORITHM TO COMPARE SETUPS 
With the algorithm established it is possible to apply the results and metricize the viability of an approach and 
feasibility of a Kill attack against a specific setup. Table 4 compares the setup and results of a brute force kill 
attack against a single tag removed from a site against both a generation one and generation two EPC tag. 
 
Table 4 – Comparison of Single Attack against Tag generations 
Variable  Generation One Generation Two 
Duration of an unsuccessful Kill 
Command 
0.1 seconds 0.1 seconds 
Timeout between Kill Commands 10 seconds 10 seconds 
Number of Tags in Range 1 1 
Individual or Multiple Passwords Individual Individual 
Key Space 16 bits = 32768 32 bits = 4,294,967,290 
Attack Time ~92 hours ~32687 years 
 
It is immediately obvious as to the effect of the increased key space. Whilst such a comparison may be obvious, 
the strength in the algorithm is its use in predictive scenarios. Table 5 demonstrates how by an alteration of tag 
time outs on generation two tag setups effects the best case attacker scenario whereby the a a sufficient 
saturation of tags within range to negate the standard 10 second timeout. To expand the impact the setup 
assumes a faster interrogator is applied. 
 
Table 5 – Comparison of Attack against generation two tag timeouts 
Variable  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Max (Tags Before Repeat) = Timeout / Attempt Time 
 
If Tags in Range < Max (Tags Before Repeat) then 
 
Full Attack = (Keyspace / Tags in Range) * (Timeout – ((Tags in Range – 1) * Attack 
Duration)) 
Else 
 
Full Attack = Key Space / (1 / Time of Attack) 
105 
 
Duration of an 
unsuccessful Kill 
Command 
0.01 seconds 0.01 seconds 0.01 seconds 
Timeout between Kill 
Commands 
0 seconds 60 seconds 90 seconds 
Number of Tags in Range 1500 1500 1500 
Individual or Multiple 
Passwords 
Individual Individual Individual 
Key Space 32 bits = 
4,294,967,290 
32 bits = 4,294,967,290 32 bits = 4,294,967,290 
Attack Time ~32 years ~32 years ~96 years 
 
The above example demonstrates that in scenarios whereby an attacker has access to enough tags to negate the 
timeout features the inclusion of the timeout has no effect. Whereas, an increase of the tag timeout negates the 
availability of tags and increases the effective brute force time. Similar scenarios may be constructed utilising 
this approach to a wide variety of hypothetical issues and this allow for discussion upon metrics related to the 
relative risks of each approach.  
CONCLUSION 
 
Whilst straightforward the algorithm presented provides a useful mechanism for the comparison of Kill attacks 
in multiple scenarios. The application of this model will allow practitioners to effectively gauge the strength of 
an RFID setup and will also provide a method to calculate if an increase in tag or reader speed will have any 
effect on the future security of their system.  
  
If we view the above methods in the light of the supermarket example mentioned in the paper, we may see the 
value of the tool. Utilising this research a security professional could quickly model the feasibility of this attack 
scenario against differing setups. This would allow for the easier communication of with both technical and non-
-‐technical stakeholders, and hopefully a more secure outcome.  
  
As stated in the parameter selection, discussion on the effect of multiple password setups has not been included 
in this paper. However, the scenarios including this approach have been modeled successfully through minor 
modifications as well as initial modifications allowing for adaption to other forms of RFID attacks. These 
models will be the subject of forthcoming publications.   
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